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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CLYDE J. KNAPP, OLIVES. KNAPP,
JEFF KNAPP, an infant, by Clyde
J. Knapp, his Guardian ad Litem,
VICKIE KNAPP, an infant, by Clyde
J. Knapp, her Guardian ad Litem,

1

Plaintiffs and Respondents, ~

Case No.
8875

vs.
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION
OF AMERICA, a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellant. 1

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for rescission of an exchange by
plaintiff and respondent, Clyde J. Knapp, of certain real
and personal property subject to contracts of sale for a
total of 1500 shares of the capital stock of defendant and
cash in the amount of $4,383.03. (For convenience, defendant and appellant will be referred to as defendant, plaintiffs and respondents will be referred to collectively as
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plaintiffs and plaintiff and respondent, Clyde J. Knapp
will be referred to as Knapp.)
Defendant is a small Utah life insurance corporation
incorporated as a stock company in 1953. Following a period of growing pains and severe financial distress (of which
more will be said later) during which period the transaction complained of took place, the defendant company was
reorganized in the fall of 1955, some $200,000.00 was invested therein by the present management and the present
management completely replaced all former officers and
all but one of the former directors. None of the present
principal stockholders nor any of the present officers or
directors had any part in the transaction complained of in
this case.
Knapp is a local businessman and has dealt in investments and real estate (Tr. 76). He has made loans in substantial amounts over the years (Tr. 100-102). He was at
the time of transaction complained of the president, a director and a stockholder in Knapp Uranium Company. The
other plaintiffs are Knapp's wife and children, respectively,
who received certain shares of defendant's stock as a part
of the transaction complained of.
Negotiations for the exchange transaction began in
early November of 1955 (Tr. 4, 177) when Daniel H.
Heaton, an old friend and business acquaintance of Knapp
(Tr. ~9-102, 174), (who was also a stock salesman for the
defendant), approached Knapp concerning an investment
in the company. He emphasized the fact that it was not
necessary to invest cash and that the company would ac-
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cept real estate (Tr. 4). Knapp and Heaton testified (Tr.
4-6, 178) that Heaton showed Knapp letters concerning the
company and its prospects written by Dr. Wesley L. Bayles
(Ex. P-1) and John H. Coles (Ex. P-3), who were both
directors of the company at the time and by Cleo H. Bullard
(Ex. P-2), who was the president and a director of the
company at the time. Later in November, Heaton took
Knapp to talk to Mr. Coles, Mr. Peter M. Lowe (who was
then vice-president and a director of the company) and Mr.
Bullard. These men discussed with Knapp the prospects
of the company, their opinion of its investment potential
and the financial situation of the company. With respect
to the latter, Knapp and Heaton stated that Mr. Coles and
Mr. Bullard discussed in some detail the company's September 30, 1954 financial statement (Ex. P-4). A sort of
prospectus was also furnished Knapp (Ex. P-28).
It would unnecessarily burden this brief to set out in
detail the discussions had during this negotiation period.
(For further detail see Tr. 9-20, 180-192.) It is sufficient to
say that plaintiffs alleged that some sixteen statements
made during these discussions or in the letters from the
directors or in the September 30, 1954 financial statement
were false. Generally, these statements related to the
financial condition of the company and its prospects for the
future and included such statements as-the company was
in "good standing" with the State Insurance Department,
the company was going to pay a dividend of ten per cent on
its outstanding stock in 1954, the September 30, 1954 financial statement set forth the true financial condition of the
company at that time, that the company had passed its
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period of growing pains. (See Findings of Fact, R. 17 for
a list of the alleged statements.)
The actual exchange transaction took place at the end
of the year 1954. The exchange contract (Ex. P-9) was
dated December 30, 1954. By the terms of the contract,
plaintiffs received a total of 1500 shares of defendant's
capital stock (Ex. P-10, Tr. 38) and cash of $4,383.03. (The
contract erroneously states this figure as $4,385.03. The
smaller amount was actually paid and accepted.) Defendant received a deed to certain farm property in Salt Lake
County (Ex. P-8) and a bill of sale to certain livestock and
equipment used on the farm. Both the farm and part of the
livestock and equipment were transferred subject to contracts of sale to Daniel H. Heaton (the same Heaton who
first approached Knapp concerning the transaction) and
Volma W. Heaton, Daniel H. Heaton's son. The balance of
the livestock and equipment was sold subject to a contract
of sale between Knapp and his wife as Sellers and Volma
W. Heaton and his wife as Buyers (see Exs. P-5, P-6, P-7
and P-8). The instruments of transfer all were dated January 5, 1955.
The exchange contract recites that the value of the
1500 shares of stock is $20.00 per share and that the total
value of the contracts covering the land, livestock and
equipment was $34,385.03 (this figure should be $34,383.03) . $34,383.03 equalled the total unpaid balance then due
on all of the contracts of sale made up of $27,875.00 then
due on the farm property and certain of the livestock and
equipment therein described (Ex. P-5) and $6,508.03 then
due on the balance of the livestock and equipment (Ex. P-6
and P-7).
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At about the same time as the transaction between
plaintiffs and defendant, new contracts of sale between
defendant and the Heatons were substituted for the old
contracts between Knapp and the Heatons which had been
assigned to defendant (Exs. P-33 and P-34). The same
property was covered but the amount of the monthly payments was reduced. These substituted contracts were both
dated December 30, 1954.
From time to time during the year 1954, the Insurance
Commisioner had questioned the financial condition of
defendant (see Exs. P-45 and P-48, Tr. 676-681) but a regular license was issued for the year 1954 (Tr. 391). On
April 8, 1954, the Insurance Commissioner notified defendant of an impairment in its capital stock (Ex. P-45).
Correspondence ensued between the Insurance Commissioner and the defendant (Exs. P-46 and P-49) and the
September 30, 1954 financial statement was prepared at
the request of the Commissioner and submitted to him in
October of that year (Tr. 682-683). The Insurance Commissioner met with officers of the defendant but no action
was taken to implement the impairment notice.
However, when the 1954 license expired on February
28, 1955, only a conditional license was issued to defendant
(Ex. D-58, Tr. 392). The Commissioner by letter of March
25, 1955 (Ex. P-52) notified defendant of certain deficiencies in its financial condition. In particular, the Commissioner noted that the defendant's holding of two parcels
of real property was illegal. One of these parcels was the
property Knapp had traded and the other was some property Heaton had transferred in exchange for stock.
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On April 6, 1955, the Commissioner formally notified
defendant of his intention to revoke defendant's certificate
of authority to do business (Ex. P-53). The time when
the revocation would take effect was extended each month
for thirty days each time until about September 1, 1955
(Tr. 357).
Shortly after the April 6, 1955 order was given, the
Insurance Commissioner appointed Herman L. Wood and
Richard K. Nelson of the accounting firm of Wood, Child,
Mann & Smith to conduct an audit of the company. Because the books of the company were not made immediately
available to these auditors the Commissioner issued his
order of April 20, 1955 (Ex. P-54) threatening immediate
revocation of the company's license because the books were
not supplied. The auditors were given access to the books
and no action was taken to implement the order of April
20th, but the company continued under the threatened revocation order of April 6th as extended from month to
month. The audit continued through the summer of 1955
and was completed in September. The audit report (Ex.
P-55) was given to the Insurance Commissioner and based
on this report demand was made on the company for a
prompt reorganization to cure its impaired financial condition (Ex. P-56). The reorganization of the company then
took place and was completed early in November of 1955.
During this period, the company continued operating
and efforts were made to satisfy the demands of the Insurance Commissioner. There was unrest among some of
the stockholders and a proxy fight was threatened to unseat
1\llr. Bullard and other directors up for re-election at the
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May, 1955 annual meeting. There is evidence (Tr. 6~1)
that prior to the annual meeting Bullard had approached
Knapp with an offer to return the property Knapp had
traded if Knapp would return his stock. Knapp denies such
an offer was made (Tr. 156-157).
The stockholders' meeting in May of 1955 came at a
period of crisis for the company. The Insurance Commissioner's demands on the company were pressing and the
proxy fight did develop. It is noteworthy that Knapp was
on the opposition slate of directors (Tr. 129-130, 736).
Knapp attended the meeting with his friend, Heaton (Tr.
130, 688).
At the meeting there was considerable and heated discussion of the actions taken and the attitude of the Insurance Commissioner. The Insurance Commissioner's orders
of April 6, 1955 and April 20, 1955, (Exhibits P-53 and
P-54) were discussed (Tr. 698-699, 730-732) and the Commissioner's letter (Ex. P-52) referring to certain deficiencies, including the illegal investment in the property traded
by Knapp, was read (Tr. 894, 695-696). Bullard told the
stockholders that the company had been impaired ( Tr.
730), but that steps were being taken to correct the situation. When Bullard was questioned further as to what
impaired meant, Vernal Bergeson, a stockholder in attendance at the meeting, said it meant the company was broke
and that "Mr. Bullard has thrown our money away" (Tr.
731).
A financial statement of the company (Ex. D-68) was
distributed to the stockholders at the meeting (Tr. 696,
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824) and was discussed ( Tr. 824) . Knapp testified that
he did not recall receiving this statement but he did receive
another financial statement (Ex. P-69) through the mail
(Tr. 137). Knapp testified that he was unconcerned about
what went on at the meeting (Tr. 136) and was willing to
rely on Mr. Bullard to correct the situation (Tr. 135). He
stated "the only things * * * of any importance"
which needed correcting was to change into an acceptable
form the real estate holdings of the company, including the
real estate he had traded to the company for his stock (Tr.
134-135).

Going back to the property Knapp traded, the Heatons
were in possession of the property at the time of the trade
and continued in possession until the summer of 1955. However, the payments on the contract fell in arrears (Tr. 231,
285-286) . Defendant took no action at that time to collect
the delinquencies. Heaton testified that in the spring of
1955, Bullard authorized Heaton to try to sell the property.
Heaton arranged a trade of the property for other property
but the deal fell through ( Tr. 226-230) . About this same
time Volma Heaton, with the consent of the defendant, sold
the livestock and equipment to a third party (Tr. 244).
Because of the delinquent payments on the contract,
a notice to quit was served on the Heatons (Ex. P-36). No
court action was taken because early in August of 1955,
the company began negotiations with Daniel H. Heaton to
rescind a transaction between the defendant and Heaton
involving a trade of stock for real property (Tr. 237, Exhibit P-31). It was suggested that a similar trade-back be
a1·ranged between Knapp and the company, and Heaton was
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authorized to approach Knapp on the subject. There is a
dispute in the testimony as to whether the offer was to
trade-back the real property for an equivalent amount of
stock with no cash being involved or whether the offer was
to return the real property in exchange for plaintiff's stock
and $2,000.00 (Tr. 157-159, 166-170, 256, 261, 263-267,
268-278,303-305, 309-312, 744-795). Knapp was approached
at least twice on this subject and turned the proposition
down saying "when you make an investment you don't want
to take it back, you want to make some money" (Tr. middle
page 158).
After Knapp refused to trade-back, the real property
Knapp had turned in was sold to Heaton and the company
took back a mortgage on the property which it now holds.
At about the same time, Heaton resold the property to J. E.
Morrison, on a real estate contract (Ex. P-39).
According to Knapp, the first idea he had that he had
been defrauded was early in September of 1955 when he
received the letter dated August 30, 1955 (Ex. P-11) from
Reese Anderson concerning the necessity for reorganization
of the company. Knapp went to his attorney, Vernon Romney, to discuss the matter. Romney went to the Insurance
Department and was told that an audit of the defendant
had been ordered which would ultimately be available for
public inspection. Knapp testified that during September
he contacted his attorney to ask about the matter and was
told that the audit was not yet available. In October, Mr.
Romney was able to inspect the audit report. A notice of
rescission (Ex. P-15) was served on the company and its
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directors on October 25, 1955 and the company refused to
rescind by letter dated November 3, 1955 (Ex. P-16).
The trial court found that of the sixteen allegedly false
statements one had not been made and another was not
entirely false. Of the remaining fourteen the trial court
found that Knapp did not reply or had no right to rely on
three of the statements. Of the remaining eleven statements the court found that the statements were false, were
made for the purpose of inducing Knapp to consummate the
exchange, were material, were relied on and believed by
Knapp, and that he had the right to rely on such statements.
The trial court further found and concluded that plaintiffs
are entitled to rescind the transaction, did not waive their
right to rescind, were not guilty of such delay or laches as
to justify denying their right to rescind, and are not estopped by their conduct or by any delay to demand rescission.
The plaintiffs prayed in the alternative for rescission
and return of all the property Knapp had traded to the
company or "in case defendant is unable to or fails to reconvey" said property, for a money judgment "for the value
of any such property which cannot be or is not so reconveyed and returned". It is self evident and conceded by
plaintiffs below that the latter alternative must apply for,
as previously stated, the livestock and equipment were sold
by Volma Heaton and are now beyond defendant's control
and the real property is now vested in D. H. Heaton subject
to a contract of sale to J. E. Morrison with defendant holding only a mortgage.
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The defendant being unable to rescind in kind, the
court awarded plaintiffs a money judgment for $34,383.03,
less the cash plaintiffs had received in the trade, plus interest. The amount of the judgment was based on a finding that the reasonable and "agreed" value of the property
traded by Knapp was $34,383.03. The court made no finding as to what the fair market value of the traded property
was at the time of the trade or at the time the notice of
rescission was given or at the time of the trial. Defendant's
attempts to prove by appraisals the fair market value of
the traded property were rejected (Tr. 795-809, Ex. 71;
Tr. 88-91, Exs. D-18 and D-19) and defendant's attempt
to inquire whether all of the property referred to in the
instruments transferred was actually transferred was rejected (Tr. 123-124).
At the trial, plaintiffs offered to accept the return of
the real property subject to the Morrison contract if defendant could negotiate successfully with Heaton to get a
reconveyance of the property (Tr. 68-72, 252-256, 803-804,
860-861). The unpaid balance due on the Morrison contract
at the time of reconveyance to plaintiffs would be credited
on the money judgment awarded and said judgment would
be partially satisfied accordingly. A money judgment was
rendered and said method of partial payment thereof was
authorized.
We have not referred in this Statement of Facts to the
testimony of Victor K. Cummings (Tr. 435-590) and Herman L. Wood (Tr. 590-625) as we believe their testimony
is not directly involved on this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
IF THERE WAS FRAUD, PLAINTIFFS ARE
NOW BARRED FROM ASSERTING IT BY
THEIR LACK OF DILIGENCE IN RESCINDING AND BY LACHES.
(a) A Party seeking rescission must give notice
of his intention to rescind promptly after discovery
of the fraud or of facts putting him on notice of
the fraud.
(b)

Plaintiffs' action should be barred by laches.
POINT II.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
MONEY JUDGMENT AWARDED PLAINTIFFS
IN THIS ACTION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IF THERE WAS FRAUD, PLAINTIFFS ARE
NOW BARRED FROM ASSERTING IT BY
THEIR LACK OF DILIGENCE IN RESCINDING AND BY LACHES.

A Party seeking resdssion must give notice
of his intention to rescind promptly after discovery
of the fraud or of facts putting him on notice of
the fraud.
(a)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
It is well settled in Utah and the great majority of

other jurisdictions that a defrauded party must act
promptly to rescind a transaction after acquiring knowledge of fraud or, its equivalent, knowledge of facts putting
him on notice of fraud. Rescission, being an equitable remedy, will be denied where the defrauded party has not
exercised the diligence equity requires. This court in Taylor
v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P. 2d 222, stated that:
"The party who has been misled is required,
as soon as he learns the truth, and discovers the
falsity of the statements on which he relied, with
all reasonable diligence to disaffirm the contract and
give the other party an opportunity of rescinding
it, and of restoring both of them to their original
position. The party deceived is not allowed to go
on deriving all possible benefit from the transaction
and then claim to be relieved of his own obligation
by seeking its rescission."
The court relied on the statement in 5 Ruling Case Law,
514 as follows :
"The great weight of authority holds that if
the party defrauded continues to receive benefits
under the contract after he has become aware of the
fraud, or if he otherwise conducts himself with
respect to it as if it were a subsisting and binding
engagement he will be deemed to have affirmed the
contract and waived his right to rescind."
Again, in McKeller Real Estate and Investment Company v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 Pac. 128, this court stated:
"Any action on the part of the purchaser treating the contract as in force, when done with a knowl-
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edge of the facts creating a right of rescission,
amounts to a waiver of the right to rescind because
of the existence of such facts."
See also Skala v. Merrill, 91 Utah 253, 64 P. 2d 185 and
Levine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2.
Delay alone is enough to preclude an action for rescission.
In the recent case of Gedstad v. Ellichman, 124 C. A.
2d 831, 269 P. 2d 661, the court denied rescission of a contract holding:
"In such a suit acting promptly is a condition
of his right to rescind, Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184
Cal. 226, 243, 193 Pac. 243; Neff v. Engler, 205 Cal.
484, 488, 271 P. 744, and therefore diligence must
be shown by the actor whereas in other actions
laches is an affirmative defense to be alleged by the
defending party. Absence of explanation of delay
may even cause a complaint for rescission to be demurrable. Bancroft v. Woodward, 183 Cal. 99, 109,
190 P. 445. A delay of more than one month in serving notice of rescission requires explanation. Campbell v. Title Guarantee Etc. Co., 121 Cal. App. 374,
377, 9 P. 2d 264. The diligence is required throughout and it applies as well to the time a person will
be held aware of his right to rescind as to the time
he will be held to have discovered the facts on which
that right is based. Bancroft v. Woodward, supra,
183 Cal. 99, 108, 190 P. 445; First Nat. Bk. v.
Thompson, 212 Cal. 388, 401, 298 P. 808."

It has been held that unless a plaintiff gives notice of re.. scission within 30 days after receiving knowledge of the
fraud or after obtaining facts which would put one on notice
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of the fraud, he is completely barred from an action of
rescission. See Campbell v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
121 C. A. 374, 9 P. 2d 264, where the court stated: "From
an examination of authorities, it would appear that 30 days
is about the utmost limit of time which the courts are disposed to allow to the purchaser for rescission, unless there
are unusual circumstances in the case excusing longer
delay." In King v. Los Angeles County Fair Association, 161
P. 2d 468, there are numerous cases cited where a delay in
taking action for less than a year was held to bar relief.
See also the cases cited in Campbell v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co., supra, and in Estrada v. Alvarez, 38 Cal. 2d 386,
240 P. 2d 278.
The above rulings apply not only when the plaintiff
fails to act diligently after knowledge of the fraud itself,
but also when the plaintiff fails to act diligently after receiving knowledge of facts putting him on notice of the
fraud. Thus, the Utah court in barring an action for rescission of the sale of stock stated "all of the facts concerning which he alleges misrepresentations could have been
learned by him, if indeed he did not already know the truth
about them, very shortly after the transaction". Skola v.
Merrill, 91 Utah 253, 64 P. 2d 185. The California court
in Bancroft v. Woodward, 183 Cal. 99, 190 Pac. 445 stated
the rule very clearly:
"It is well settled that where a party has knowledge of facts of a character which would reasonably
put him upon inquiry, and such inquiry, if pursued,
would have led to a discovery of the fraud or other
ground for rescission, he will be charged with having discovered the fraud or other ground as of the
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time he should have discovered it, that is, as of the
time when he would have discovered it if he had
with reasonable diligence, pursued the inquiry when
he should have done so. Lady Washington, etc., Co.
v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 45 P. 809; Harrington v.
Patterson, 124 Cal. 542, 57 P. 476.
"The reason for this rule is that diligence
throughout is required of one who would rescind.
It is a reason which applies with equal if not greater
force to the time at which such a person, after learning of the facts upon which his right is based, will
be held to be aware of their legal consequence, his
right to rescind. It is at least intimated in Ruhl v.
M ott, 120 Cal. 668, 679, 53 P. 304, and Hannah v.
Steinman, 159 Cal. 142, 153, 112 P. 1094, that the
rule is the same in regard to the time as of which
a person seeking rescission will be charged with
knowledge of his right, as it is in regard to the time
as of which he will be charged with a discovery of
the facts which give him the right, and the reason for
this is so plain that we have no hesitation in declaring it to be the case."
See also, Lady Washington Etc. Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal.
482, 45 Pac. 809; Gedstad v. Ellichman, supra; Garstang v.
Skinner, 165 Cal. 721, 134 Pac. 329.
Considering now the facts in this case, it is apparent
that Knapp knew of the fraud or of extremely suspicious
circumstances in connection with the company long prior to
October 25, 1955, when he finally gave defendant notice of
rescission. The court will note that virtually all of the
alleged misrepresentations relate to the financial condition
of the defendant. It was, of course, primarily financial
difficulties that caused the concern of the Insurance Com-
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missioner and led to his actions as outlined in the Statement of Facts and eventually to the financial and managerial reorganization of the company in the fall of 1955.
Finding of Fact No.6 of the court (R. 19) we consider
very significant. The court stated that representations (l)
and (m) (R. 17) relating to the absence on the September
30, 1954 financial statement of a liability for reserves and
of a liability for unearned premiums was not believed by
Knapp "since it appears probable that if plaintiff, Clyde J.
Knapp, gave consideration to such items he would have
assumed that there would be liabilities for outstanding policies and for unearned premiums". In other words, Knapp
either knew these representations were false and did nothing about it, or he could not reasonably rely on such statements. Certainly, the absence of these items which are
normally found on an insurance company's financial statement should have made Knapp somewhat suspicious at the
very outset of the negotiations.
The trial court also found that the alleged misrepresentation (h) that the company would pay a 10% dividend
in the year 1954 was not relied on by Knapp as he questioned that fact (R. 19). According to Heaton, when
Bullard made this statement "kind of a grin came upon
his [Knapp's] face, he noticed it in particular because he
couldn't take that * * *" (Tr. 191). Knapp testified
he questioned Bullard about such a dividend "it didn't
sound right for a new insurance company to start paying
so soon * * *" (Tr. 96) But Knapp went no further
with the matter, questioned no one about it and apparently
made no objection to anyone when the company paid no
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dividend, although certainly a dividend for 1954 would have
been declared early in 1955.
After the transaction was consummated and prior to
the May stockholders' meeting, Knapp heard rumors that
the president of the company, Bullard, was turning down
business simply because he did not like the salesman who
wrote the business (Tr. 129). Such a shocking accusation
certainly suggested managerial incompetence if not wrong
doing, and if true, must have had a serious effect on the
financial condition of the company, but Knapp apparently
ignored it-made no investigation at all.
The evidence shows that the president of the company,
Bullard, apparently anticipating a proxy fight at the May
stockholders' meeting attempted to "wash out" Knapp's
block of stock by offering to trade back the property Knapp
had turned in for the stock he received (Tr. 691-692).
Whether Knapp did agree to the trade or not, the very fact
that the offer was made should have indicated to him that
something was wrong, else Bullard would not have been
so anxious to buy off Knapp's voting power.
But assuming these facts separately or together did
not give Knapp notice or establish a duty to inquire, certainly he received an eye-opener at the May stockholders'
meeting. There Bullard stated that the Insurance Commissioner "was giving trouble" about the Heaton and Knapp
real estate (Tr. 131). Knapp grudgingly admitted (Tr.
134) that "there was some mention" of the Insurance Commissioner's Notice of Intention to Revoke the Company's
license in 30 days (Exhibit P-53). In fact, Bullard was
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sharply questioned about such notice and about the subsequent order (Exhibit P-54) giving the Company only five
days to surrender its books or suffer receivership (Tr.
698-699, 730-732) and was, in effect, called a liar for not
admitting the issuance of the second order (Tr. 699). Accusations were made that the company was broke (Tr.
731) and Bullard admitted that if new money was not put
into the company, liquidation would be necessary and "we
would lose everything" (Tr. 737). Reese Anderson stated
that unless the company was refinanced, it would be taken
over by the Insurance Commission, operated for the benefit
of the policyholders and the stockholders would get nothing
(Tr. 826).
The letter from the Insurance Commissioner to Mr.
Lowe (Exhibit P-52) was read (Tr. 824, 695-696). There
was a discussion of the Commissioner's objections to the
Knapp and Heaton properties (Tr. 696, 134). Bullard said
that the company had been impaired (Tr. 730), but that
steps were being taken to correct the situation. When
Bullard was questioned further as to what impaired meant,
Vernal Bergeson, a stockholder in attendance at the meeting said it meant the company was broke and "Mr. Bullard
has thrown our money away" (Tr. 731). That there was
merit in this statement was shown by the financial statement (Exhibit D-68) distributed to the stockholders at the
meeting (Tr. 696, 824). The financial statement was discussed ( Tr. 824) .
If anything could shock Knapp out of his lethargy, the
financial statement should have done it. It showed, among
other things, a bank overdraft of in excess of $1,000 and
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cash on hand of only $270.69. Amounts due from agents
had increased to $43,000-nearly double the amount shown
on the September 30th statement. (The comparison is important because it is the financial data shown on the SePtember 30, 1954 statement (Exhibit P-4) which Knapp
claims he relied on in making the trade of his property for
the stock.) Liabilities of about $18,000 were shown, plus
an additional amount of $4,500 shown in the footnote to the
balance sheet. Quite a contrast from the $3,400 liabilities
on September 30th.
Knapp did not recall such a statement at the meeting
though he admitted it might have been distributed (Tr.
136-137). He did recall receiving Exhibit P-69. There it
was plainly stated that on March 31, 1955, the company
had a bank overdraft of nearly $3,000. Cash had decreased
from $10,000 at the end of 1953 to $1,600 at the end of 1954
and was only slightly more than $900 as of March 31, 1955.
Although liabilities had decreased slightly from December
31, 1954, as of March 31, 1955, the liabilities were about 8
times larger than the liabilities shown on the September
30, 1954, statement. Of the $23,000 in bonds shown on the
September 30th statement, only $11,900 was left on March
31, 1955.
Despite all this, Knapp was unconcerned about what
went on at the meeting (Tr. 136). He was willing to rely
on Mr. Bullard to correct the situation (Tr. 135) even
though he agreed to run as a director on Mr. Lowe's slate
-the purpose of which was to unseat Bullard. He wanted
to be a director to protect his investment and "so I could
get in anrl perhaps correct affairs" (Tr. 135-136). He felt
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that the only corrective measures necessary were to change
the nature of the real estate acquired from himself and
Heaton-real estate which he knew made up a major part
of the assets of the company. But he did nothing to determine whether the corrective measures were taken. Although he had run as a director so he could participate in
these corrective measures, when a dispute arose as to the
computation of the vote·, he sat back and. decided the only
thing to do was to forget being elected a director (Tr. 147).
He did not inquire of the Insurance Department of the
status of the orders referred to at the meeting and whether
the company had corrected the matter. The extent of his
diligence was to ask Mr. Bullard at a casual meeting, "How
are things coming?", to which Bullard answered, "Fine"
(Tr. 149).
May passed and Knapp did nothing. June passed and
Knapp did nothing. July passed and Knapp did nothing.
Then in August, 1955, Heaton called Knapp and asked him
if he wanted to trade back his stock for the property (Tr.
157-160). Knapp claims that he felt the corrective measures
referred to in the stockholders' meeting had been made by
August (Tr. 157). But was he concerned that no such measures had been taken by August when the Company still
had the real estate and wanted to get rid of it to Knapp?
Apparently not. His reaction was to stand pat for "when
you make an investment you don't want to take it back,
you want to make some money" (Tr. middle page 158).
By his own inaction after notice, Knapp waived his
right to rescind. He had notice prior to the stockholders'
meeting but when rumors of mismanagement were circu-
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lated he was apparently unconcerned. When no dividend
was paid as represented Knapp did nothing. He had notice
of the most startling kind, for such an "innocent" as he,
from the statements made at the stockholders' meeting and
from the financial statements distributed there. He had
notice when the company offered to trade back, a trade
back made necessary in order to remove the inadmissible
real estate from the company's books and thus satisfy the
Insurance Commissioner. Knapp knew of the Commissioner's demand at the time of the stockholders' meeting. In
fact, according to Knapp this conversion of assets was the
only thing he recalled "of any importance that was to be
done" (Tr. 134-135). That this had not been done more
than three months after the meeting where the need for
immediate correction was first stated, should have excited
some suspicion in a man with his business background.
Contrast these facts with what Knapp claims (Tr.
43) first excited his suspicion-the letter from Reese Anderson (Exhibit P-11) dated August 30, 1955. The letter
merely referred to the necessity for a reorganization and
urged prompt action by the stockholders to effectuate it.
Reorganization of a sort involving investment by a group
of doctors had been discussed at the stockholders' meeting
in May (Tr. 131, 132) and it was stated that the Insurance
Commissioner would take over the company unless it was
recapitalized (Tr. 826). The letter was rather mild in tone,
merely requesting a prompt decision on signing the voting
trust agreement. It speaks of continuing the company in
business by a recapitalization in contrast to the discussion
at the stockholders' meeting three months earlier of the
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Insurance Commissioner's order threatening to terminate
the company's right to do any business. If the letter made
him suspicious of fraud committed in December, why then
did he ignore the Commissioner's orders or the financial
statements discussed at the May meeting? We respectfully
contend that Knapp failed to exercise the diligence required
of him and is thus precluded from rescinding at this time.
As Justice Elias Hansen stated in his concurring opinion to
Skola v. Merrill, supra:
"He should not be permitted to hold the stock
to see if it would turn out to be a profitable investment despite the claimed fraud, and then when it
did not prove profitable recover back all that he
paid. It may be that plaintiff has an action at law
for fraud, but upon this record he is not entitled to
rescission (64 P. 2d at 192) ".
(b)

Plaintiffs' action should be barred by laches.

In addition to Knapp's lack of diligence! which we feel
is an element of plaintiffs' cause of action, we believe the
facts also support the affirmative defense of laches.
Upon notice from the Insurance Commissioner that the
Knapp property was an inadmissible asset, it became necessary for the company to convert it into admissible form.
In August defendant approached plaintiff in an attempt
to arrange a trade back of the property. When Knapp
turned the deal down "to wait and see what happens", the
company was forced to sell the property to Heaton. Upon
the sale it became impossible to place the parties in status
quo. Had Knapp acted diligently it would now be possible
to return the property to him.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
In Raht v. Sevier Mining & Milling Company, 18 Utah
290, 54 Pac. 889, plaintiffs sued to recover certain mining
stock which had been sold under an invalid assessment. The
Utah court in declaring the claim barred by laches stated:
"A party claiming an interest should be held
to prompt action and decide whether he will share
the risks or stand clear from them."
See also Skola v. Merrill, supra; Sanders v. McGill, 9 Cal.
2d 145, 70 P. 2d 159; Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.
s. 587.
The necessity of refinancing the company was discussed as early as the May stockholders' meeting and beginning in August and continuing through September and
October the company took steps to reorganize. By September 13th (Exhibit P-12) it became apparent that there
would be a devaluation of the stock in order to establish an
equitable division between the new and old stockholders.
It was only after the reorganization plan was nearly completed that Knapp gave notice of his intention to rescind.
By that time it was too late for the new stockholders to
back out as their investment of $200,000 had already been
placed in escrow (see Exhibit P-14).
Thus, due to Knapp's delay, the defendant has been
prejudiced in these two respects and Knapp's claim should
be barred by laches.
POINT II.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
MONEY JUDGMENT AWARDED PLAINTIFFS
IN THIS ACTION.
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Plaintiffs' complaint is for rescission and prays for
reconveyance of the real and personal property and contracts therefor, or in case defendant is unable to so reconvey, for the value of such property. They further allege
that the "agreed and reasonable value" of such property
was the sum of $34,383.03. It was conceded that the alternative prayer applied for both the real estate and the personal property are out of defendant's hands and defendant
cannot be required to do that which it has no power to do.
We contend it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to prove,
as a prerequisite to any money judgment, that the property was worth what they allege it to be. The purpose of
an action in rescission is to restore the status quo. Assuming the other prerequisites to the action have been met,
including diligence of the plaintiff, the ordinary result is
to restore the property in kind. If plaintiff had paid cash,
then the court restores that amount of cash, plus interest.
If an exchange of property is involved, the court orders a
reconveyance. But where the property cannot be reconveyed, the court must award its equivalent in cash and
since the purpose of the action is to restore the status quo,
this equivalent must be the value of the property at the
time of the transaction. Otherwise, there is no assurance
that the true status quo is restored without penalty to the
defendant or unjust enrichment to the plaintiffs.
This was clearly recognized in the case of Marks v.
Howkins, 55 Cal. App. 664, 203 Pac. 1035. In that case the
plaintiffs traded their home plus some cash for a farm.
Because the farm was not as represented, they asked and
received rescission. The court awarded judgment requir-
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ing reconveyance by both parties, but if defendant failed to
reconvey within 60 days, plaintiffs were given a money
judgment which the findings recited represented the cash
value of the house traded by plaintiffs. On appeal, complaint was made of the alternative judgment. The court
held the judgment was proper so that the parties could be
returned to status quo. Noting that the property might
depreciate or have been transferred to innocent third parties (there was no evidence that either of these things had
happened) the court stated:
"Certainly, in either of the suppositions cases,
the plaintiffs would be entitled to be paid, in lieu
of the deli very to them of the possession of the
property, the value thereof at the time of the consummation of the agreement of exchange." (Emphasis added.)
In Blahnik v. Small Farms Improvement Co., 181 Cal.
379, 184 Pac. 661, plaintiff purchased real estate for $3,750.
Defendant acknowledged receipt of $2,300 which it was
shown was paid not in cash but by the transfer of other real
estate. On rescission, the property traded not being available for reconveyance, judgment was awarded for $2,300
notwithstanding evidence of value which at most would
have fixed the actual value at only $2,000. In reversing this
judgment, the court stated:
"The [trial] court, apparently, proceeded upon
the theory that the plaintiffs were entitled to treat
the amount for which said property was taken in
exchange as a payment in money upon the price of
the property sold to the plaintiffs by defendant and
to recover said amount upon a rescission. In this
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the court erred. If the defendant had retained the
title to the property, the most that the plaintiffs
could have demanded upon the rescission would have
been a reconveyance thereof to them. The defendant having parted with the title thereto, and being
unable to restore the plaintiffs to the position in
which they were at the time the contract was made,
the rule in equity is that they must compensate the
plaintiffs for the loss thereby sustained. This would
not be the price at which the property had been
accepted upon the contract of sale, but would be its
value at that time and it was therefore necessary
for the court to determine such value. * * *
The plaintiffs were not entitled to more than the
actual value of the property at the time of the exchange. The judgment giving them the full amount
at which it was taken in the contract is erroneous
to the extent of the difference between the actual
value and the price so fixed in the exchange. For
this reason a reversal is necessary. The complaint
did not raise this question, but it was put in issue
by the allegations of the answer. There should have
been a finding of the actual value of the property
at that time and the judgment should have covered
that amount only."

Lasher v. Faw, 209 Cal. 726, 289 Pac. 821, directly
supports our position. There property was deeded defendant under an agreement of plaintiff to pay $2,500 or convey the property. He chose the latter alternative. Thereafter, the defendant sold the property for $2,000. The
court granted rescission and because reconveyance was impossible, gave plaintiff judgment not for $2,000 or the
$2,500 value stated in the contract but for $4,000, the reasonable market value of the property.
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In Swan v. Talbot, 152 Cal. 142, 94 Pac. 238, 17 L. R.
A., N. S. 1066, plaintiff, through defendant's fraud, conveyed property worth $21,900 in exchange for $200 cash
and satisfaction of a $10,600 indebtedness. Because rescission could not be granted in kind, the property having been
conveyed to a third person, judgment was granted and
affirmed on appeal for the difference between the value
of the property conveyed and the amount of the indebtedness.
In Merigold v. Gagnon, 131 Cal. App. 213, 20 P. 2d 986,
plaintiffs sought to rescind a land transaction wherein
plaintiffs agreed to purchase land from defendants. In
payment plaintiffs transferred land which the contract
recited was worth $3,735, paid cash of $50 and agreed to
make additional monthly payments of $50. The trial court
denied rescission and on appeal plaintiffs contended a finding they had paid only $50 was unsupported by the evidence
as land worth $3,735 had also been "paid". The appellate
court held the finding was proper, that the $3,735 represented the land and on rescission plaintiffs could only
recover the value of the land at the time of the transaction.
There being no evidence of value offered "the finding of
the trial court was actually demanded by the state of the
evidence". Note that the statement in the contract that the
land was worth $3,735 did not fix the value of the land on
rescission and was not considered by the court even to be
evidence of value.
Plaintiffs have completely failed to prove the value of
the property they transferred. They took the position
t!u·oughout the trial that the amount stated in the exchange
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agreement (Ex. P-9) was binding upon the parties to the
exchange agreement and no proof could be introduced of
the actual value of the property at the time of the exchange.
We offered proof as to the fair market value of the traded
property (Tr. 795-809, Ex. 71; Tr. 88-91, Exs. D-18 and
D-19), but plaintiffs insisted that the "agreed value" stated
in the exchange agreement controlled and no evidence to
the contrary could be introduced. Plaintiffs did not assert
that the price stated in the exchange agreement was evidence of the fair market value but in effect stated that the
fair market value was unimportant because the price had
been agreed upon in the written contract between the parties. The trial court accepted this view and gave judgment
accordingly.
The result is that plaintiffs have recovered a money
judgment for what we believe to be in excess of the fair
market value of the traded property. The status quo has
not been restored. Plaintiffs have been enriched to the extent of the difference between the value of the property
they traded and the fair market value at the time of the
trade and defendant has been penalized accordingly. To
avoid this unjust result the judgment must be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should
be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,
H. R. WALDO, JR.,
of Ray, Rawlins, Jones
& Henderson,
Attorneys for Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

